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Business-Managed Democracy: The Trade Agenda 
Sharon Beder 
 
Abstract:  
The architecture of global governance that has emerged in the past two decades has 
been strongly influenced by transnational policy actors. This article examines the role 
of transnational corporate agency in social policy by focusing in particular on the role 
of business coalitions, elite networking bodies and policy planning groups in fostering 
unity amongst corporate actors and enrolling political actors into managing 
democracies in the interests of business. The example of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) is used to 
examine how corporate agency is wielded through elite networking organisations and 
how this is eroding national social policy. 
 
keywords: business influence, corporate coalitions, GATT negotiations, World Trade 
Organization, General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of the many powerful business coalitions that corporations have formed 
in recent decades is to ensure that corporate interests are advanced over the welfare, 
health and other interests of national populations and to undermine the democratic 
process for deciding government priorities and policies. What business leaders seek, 
and to a large extent have achieved, are ‘business-managed democracies’, that is, 
democracies where the politics and cultural life of nations are managed in the 
interests of business. 
 
Klaus Schwab, a long-time president of the World Economic Forum (a group formed 
from 1000 CEOs of the world’s largest corporations), argued in 1999 that the 
“sovereign state has become obsolete” and that the preference of the chief executives of 
large corporations is for national governments to become subservient to corporate and 
financial interests (Quoted in Machan, 1999; Overbeck, 1998). David Rockefeller 
(1999, p. 41) wrote in Newsweek that business people favour lessening the role of 
government but that this means that “somebody has to take government’s place, and 
business seems to me to be a logical entity to do it.” Rockefeller was founder and 
chairman of the Trilateral Commission, an elite group of business leaders and others 
from the US, Japan and Europe seeking to guide international affairs. 
 
Corporations have always had a certain amount of power through their ability to 
make decisions concerning production and employment. And as they have grown in 
size and number that economic power has become significant and has been used to 
exert political influence. Individual corporations frequently influence the political 
process on matters of immediate financial interest to themselves through donations 
and lobbying and the threat of transferring their activities abroad. They also play a 
major role in setting the political and the public agenda through their use of public 
relations, lobbying, and funding of third parties such as media, think tanks, and 
business organizations. (Beder, 2002 & 2006b)  
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However, corporations have not been content with the degree of economic power and 
political influence they can wield individually. Since the mid-20th Century they  have 
sought to increase their collective power,  consolidating their political influence to 
pressure governments to make decisions in favour of business interests. And since the 
1970s corporate coalitions have moved from defending their economic freedom from 
the demands and interventions of labour unions and governments, to being far more 
aggressive in their goals extending them from just determining economic policy to 
social policy as well. Their takeover of key areas of government policy making and 
service provision has meant that as time goes by democratic power is undermined and 
thwarted (Beder, 2006a).  
 
Many of the subsequent changes since the 1980s have been blamed on the rise of 
neoliberalism. However it is important to recognise that for many years neoliberal 
economic theories were considered marginal and obsolete. They moved from the 
margins of economic thought to the centre of orthodoxy because they became useful to 
business interests seeking to minimize government interference in their activities and 
expand markets. Neoliberal theories were embraced by big business because they 
provided a legitimation for their unimpeded pursuit of self-interest and avenues for 
business expansion. The policy prescriptions that suited business best—including 
privatisation of government services and deregulation of labour and business—were 
justified by this body of economic theory that presented such policies as being in the 
public interest (Beder, 2006b: ch. 7). 
 
However, neoliberalism is only useful for business-managing society when the 
economy is expanding and corporate profits are increasing. In times of economic 
downturn, as the recent global financial crisis has demonstrated, business leaders 
manage governments into supplying bailouts for companies and government spending 
for economic stimulus. The apparent retreat from neoliberal policies doesn’t signal a 
retreat of business from managing democracies. Business-friendly policies are being 
maintained in business-managed democracies around the world. 
 
This paper will focus on the way business coalitions have sought to expand markets 
through the exercise of business-managed democracy. It will show how they have 
mobilised and lobbied to get governments to sign up to trade agreements. These 
agreements are portrayed as being about economic trade but are really about ensuring 
that the social and environmental policy and regulations of nation states does not 
interfere with the ability of transnational corporations (TNCs) to invest, trade and sell 
their services anywhere in the world. In particular, the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS) is aimed at promoting and locking in the commodification, 
privatisation and deregulation of public services ranging from water, waste disposal, 
electricity and telecommunications through to welfare, health and education, so that 
TNCs can profit from them. 
 
 
 
POLITICAL MOBILISATION 
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The political mobilization of business interests since the 1970s meant that 
corporations began to act as a class with a shared ideology rather than a collection of 
competing companies with some common business interests. The class consciousness 
of top corporate executives was facilitated by the growth of inter-corporate networks of 
ownership and interlocking directorates of large corporations, which gave rise to a 
growing number of corporate executives who occupied positions on the boards of 
several companies. These corporate executives became politically active on behalf of 
business in general. They provided the leadership for business coalitions and 
associations and were employed at the top levels of the largest corporations (Useem, 
1984:5). Many of these coalitions are now global in their reach reflecting the 
transnational nature of the modern corporation. The corporate class has evolved into a 
transnational capitalist class (Sklair, 2000).  
 
The inner circle of corporate executives facilitated the formation of many business 
associations and coalitions that sought a more general political agenda than 
traditional trade associations; one that was not industry or region specific. The new 
associations present a united front for their corporate members and assert the power 
of large corporations in political forums. These associations cooperate with each other 
and “perform largely complementary tasks.” (Useem, 1984: 70-1) They not only share 
members and even leaders, but associations and coalitions often join other 
associations and coalitions as members, or create new associations and coalitions for 
specific purposes.  
 
In this way a vast network of business coalitions and groups, supported by an array of 
corporate-funded think tanks and public relations firms, proliferated during the 1980s 
and 90s. Their purpose is not only to coordinate public relations campaigns as in 
earlier times but to exert collective pressure on policy makers. For example the rise of 
Thatcherism in Britain can be attributed in large part to the endeavours of two think 
tanks: the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) and the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS). 
In the US too, conservative corporate-funded think tanks have been responsible for 
the transmission and promotion of free market ideas and policies since the rise of 
Reagan in the 1980s (Beder, 2006a: chapter 1). In both cases, social policy was 
dominated by the privatisation of services such as health, education, water and 
electricity, as well as restrictions on government spending affecting welfare provision. 
 
 
THE WTO: UNDERMINING CITIZEN DEMOCRACY 
 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the organization that ensures that trade 
rules prioritise business interests over national and public interests. It has greater 
powers than any other international institution including powers to punish non-
complying nations that are not even available to the United Nations. Over 130 nations 
are now members of the WTO. It has become a form of global government in its own 
right with judicial, legislative and executive powers. (Clarke, c. 1999: 4-5) 
the WTO has come to rival the International Monetary Fund as the most 
powerful, secretive, and anti-democratic international body on earth. It is 
rapidly assuming the mantle of a bona fide global government for the ‘free 
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trade era,’ and it actively seeks to broaden its powers and reach (Barker & 
Mander, 1999: 1). 
The WTO is able to enforce its rules through its dispute settlement mechanism. If one 
country complains that another is not abiding by WTO rules, the case is heard by 
panels of unelected lawyers and trade officials “with no education or training in social 
or environmental issues”, behind closed doors with no public scrutiny. These panels 
are able to find countries guilty of breaking the rules and to impose economic 
sanctions as punishment. (Barker & Mander, 1999: 2)  
 
Such rulings can declare as illegal legislation put in place by democratically elected 
governments as part of their social or environmental policy agenda. The WTO has 
fairly extensive powers to discipline nation states—as well as local, state and regional 
governments—for regulations and controls that are claimed to interfere with trade. 
WTO rules also take precedence over other international agreements designed to 
protect public health and welfare including agreements such as the Convention on 
Biodiversity and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 
(Barker & Mander, 1999: 6). 
 
WTO rulings consistently favour free trade over environmental or social 
considerations. CorpWatch noted that between 1995 and 2001 “the WTO has ruled 
that every environmental policy it has reviewed is an illegal trade barrier that must 
be eliminated or changed.” The same was true of health and safety laws with only one 
exception (Anon, 2001). A more recent study by Public Citizen (2008: 3) found that 
almost 90 percent of the 137 WTO challenges to national laws between 1995 and 2008 
were successful, forcing nations to alter their laws to fit with WTO rules. 
 
A good example of how trade priorities trump social policy priorities occurred in 2004 
when a WTO panel ruled that the US government could not ban internet gambling. 
The panel conceded ‘that the measures at issue were indeed designed so as to protect 
public morals or to maintain public order’ but decided that the measures were not 
allowable because: 
the United States had failed to demonstrate that they were ‘necessary’ since 
it had not shown that there was no WTO-consistent alternative measure 
reasonably available that would provide the United States with the same 
level of protection against the risks it had identified. (WTO Panel, 2004: 
135) 
In answer to the issue of whether a nation had the right to regulate in response to 
democratically formulated policy, the panel of three trade experts that made the 
gambling ruling stated: ‘Members’ regulatory sovereignty is an essential pillar of the 
progressive liberalization of trade in services, but this sovereignty ends whenever 
rights of other Members under the GATS are impaired.’ (WTO Panel, 2004: 209)  
 
In other words, the ban on internet gambling was ruled to be a trade restriction that 
interfered with the rights of another member of GATS – in this specific case the 
complainant state, Antigua – where at least one transnational gambling corporation 
had its nominal base of operations. According to the ruling, if the US wants to protect 
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public morals it has to find a way to do it which does not restrict corporate rights to 
trade. Otherwise the onus is on the US government to prove no such alternative 
exists. 
 
The WTO ruling required US social policy with respect to gambling to be changed at 
both the state and federal levels of government.  
 
In 2008 Public Citizen published a report showing that many of the proposed health 
and environmental policies being proposed by US presidential candidates would 
require modification to WTO rules before they could be passed. For example, Obama’s 
proposal to require large employers to contribute to the health insurance of their 
employees could be interpreted as favouring small employers that would mainly be 
locally owned and this would be discriminatory against larger foreign companies. The 
report concluded that “unless a government could foresee that it would need to take 
future action on an unimaginably broad swath of policy areas when it made its initial 
WTO commitments in 1994, it now faces unacceptable WTO constraints on new non-
trade policies deemed necessary”, including social policies (Public Citizen, 2008).  
 
 
BUSINESS LOBBYING 
 
A range of powerful corporate lobbying groups and coalitions were crucial in 
advancing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and establishing the 
WTO. Within each of the major nations that dominated the GATT negotiations, 
business leaders had privileged access to influence their country’s negotiating position. 
The economic or trade ministry officials involved in the negotiations were lobbied 
extensively by industry at both a national level and an international level by groups 
such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the OECD's Business and 
Industry Advisory Council (BIAC) (Hoedeman & al., 1998). No other non-government 
groups had the access or influence accorded to business groups. In this way, the 
negotiating positions of the dominant nations reflected business interests rather than 
a broad spectrum of democratic interests.  
 
Several large and powerful business organizations campaigned for the successful 
completion of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations in 1994 and the expansion of 
free trade. They included the International Chamber of Commerce, The Bilderberg 
Club and the Trilateral Commission (Beder, 2006a). 
 
The European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) was a leading lobbying force 
during the Uruguay Round and it claims some of the credit for the completion of the 
Round. Its Trade & Investment working group worked closely with the US Business 
Roundtable. (ERT, 2003a; 2003b: 40)  The ERT was founded in 1983 to represent 
European business interests and their push for free trade. It was modeled on the 
Business Roundtable in the US. Membership is by invitation only and includes Chairs 
and CEOs of major multinational companies headquartered in Europe, including 
Bayer, Fiat, BP, Royal Dutch/Shell, Unilever, Volvo, Hoffmann-La Roche, Total, 
Renault and Siemens (ERT, 2004). 
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The ERT has had privileged access to EU policy-makers and national government 
leaders and that access has become institutionalized as the ERT has been integrated 
into EU committees. Its privileged access to ministers and leaders is reinforced by 
personal contacts and friendships, including those between successive ERT chairs and 
EC Presidents. (CEO, 1997; Doherty & Hoedeman, 1994; ERT, 2003b: 33,46). At the 
end of the Uruguay Round an ERT delegation of 14 CEOs met with the French prime 
minister “to help resolve the European position in the talks” (ERT, 2003b: 53). 
 
The US-based MTN (Multilateral Trade Negotiations) Coalition was formed in 1990 as 
part of the lobbying effort to kick start the suspended negotiations. The Coalition 
lobbied within the  US for congressional support for the GATT negotiations and also 
outside the US. Coalition representatives visited London in 1991 to “drum up British 
support for a wide-ranging trade agreement”. (Norman, 1991: 13) 
 
The MTN Coalition claimed to represent 14,000 US companies including the major 
multinationals such as IBM, General Motors, American Express, General Electric, 
Citicorp and associations such as the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) 
and the US Council for International Business (USCIB). It claimed to be “the largest 
coalition in history.” (quoted in Peng, 1990: 10) 
 
The World Economic Forum (WEF) also played a major role during the Uruguay  
Round. The WEF claims to be the “leading interface for business/ government 
interaction” and “a major force for economic integration at the corporate as well as the 
national economic levels.” (WEF, 2000) The WEF has power through the financial 
power of its members. It wields influence through bringing the world’s top business 
people and  top policy makers together at its annual meetings at Davos and elsewhere. 
Its meetings include an Informal Gathering of Trade Ministers (Beder, 2006a: 112).  
 
 
TRADE IN SERVICES 
 
The Uruguay Round went far beyond, in both power and scope, the limited objectives 
of lowering tariffs on manufactured goods. Pressured by TNCs, negotiators from the 
US and the EU sought to include services, intellectual property rights and investment 
rights as part of GATT despite the opposition of developing nations (Beder, 2006a). 
 
Included in the final GATT agreement was the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS). The aim of GATS is to open up the provision of all services— 
including health, education, water, electricity and telecommunications—to foreign 
investment through privatisation and deregulation (referred to as liberalisation). It 
prohibits governments from discriminating against foreign multinational companies 
that want to buy government services or compete to supply them, in areas that 
governments agree to liberalise.  
 
Under GATS rules, once a country decides to liberalise its electricity or water it cannot 
put any limits on foreign ownership nor limit how much of the industry one company 
can own. Also a government is not allowed to favour local businesses, so that if it 
subsidizes renewable sources of electricity, such as hydroelectricity, and these 
subsidized sources are mainly owned by local companies, then that could be 
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interpreted as discriminating against foreign service providers that use ‘dirty’ sources 
of power like oil and gas (Cohen, 2002: 10-11).  
 
Also, if services such as health and education are committed to GATS then 
government subsidies would be seen as giving unfair advantage to local providers. And 
it is likely that governments would not be able to set price caps on the fees charged for 
essential services like water and electricity. Governments would therefore lose the 
ability to ensure that these services were affordable to their poorer citizens (unless 
sectors of the population are directly subsidized with taxpayer funds, which would be 
paid to the foreign companies) (CEO, 2000c). 
 
GATS also prevents national governments from putting quantitative limits on services 
once a service sector has been committed. So if a government agrees to liberalise 
tourism services, for instance, it cannot then limit the number of beach resorts to 
protect the environment or the community atmosphere of an area without being 
subject to challenge under GATS rules (Wesselius, 2002: 5). 
 
GATS restrains governments from imposing social policy standards that might hinder 
free trade in these services. Article VI of the GATS agreement only allows regulations 
where regulatory objectives are legitimate; the regulation is necessary; and the 
regulation does not restrict trade more than necessary (ESF, 2002: 5). Illegitimate 
regulations might include professional standards, taxation policies, and other policies 
to achieve objectives such as preserving government services or providing 
employment. (Wesselius, 2002: 4)  
 
  As a practical matter, this means nations will have to shape laws protecting the 
air you breathe, the trains you travel in and the food you chew by picking not the 
best or safest means for the nation, but the cheapest methods for foreign 
investors and merchants (Palast, 2001a). 
 
Attempts within the WTO to establish a list of legitimate objectives for regulations 
has proven difficult. GATS requires that domestic regulations such as environmental 
regulations should be developed in accordance with international standards, that is, if 
regulations accord with international standards they would meet the necessity test 
(ESF, 2002: 5-6). 
 
As part of the official offers and requests process aimed at expanding GATS 
commitments, the European Commission (EC) has requested that other nations open 
up their water sectors, large parts of their energy sectors including electricity, and 
other sectors such as transport, to competition from abroad. These requests were not 
an outcome of democratic decision making in Europe but were kept secret until they 
were leaked.  
 
There are ongoing efforts to keep GATS offers and requests secret and therefore to 
inhibit public debate and democratic input into decision-making. In January 2003, 
Pascal Lamy, the EC trade commissioner advised governments that they would not be 
able to distribute copies of offers to their parliaments (Anon, 2003: 7). 
 
The Corporate Europe Observatory argues that these requests show that the EC 
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intends ‘to use the GATS talks to deregulate and de facto privatise essential services, 
particularly in the South’ (CEO, 2002). According to the World Development 
Movement, any developing country escaping privatization of services under World 
Bank or IMF structural adjustment packages, or seeking to reverse them, ‘will feel a 
left hook coming in from the WTO’. It notes that if GATS negotiations are successful, 
‘governments will be forced to privatise services and the sale will be irreversible’ 
(WDM, 2001: 3). Moreover, GATS will provide an excuse for governments that want to 
privatize against the will of the people, for reasons of corruption or ideology or 
misconception. They can pass on responsibility for the decision to the WTO which has 
required it. 
 
 
TRADE IN SERVICES COALITIONS 
 
The role of multinational corporations in incorporating services into the free trade 
agenda is undisputed. David Hartridge, Director of the WTO Services Division till 
2001, admitted that ‘without the enormous pressure generated by the American 
financial services sector, particularly companies like American Express and Citicorp, 
there would have been no services agreement.’ (Quoted in Puscas, 2003: 3) 
 
The Coalition of Service Industries (CSI), a group of large US-based multinational for-
profit service corporations, was formed in 1982 with American Express playing a 
major coordinating role. Its initial purpose was to get services included in the GATT 
round of negotiations and to make trade in services ‘a central goal of future trade 
liberalization initiatives’ (CSI, 2003a).  
 
CSI boasts of its ‘excellent access to U.S. and foreign governments and international 
organizations’ (Vastine, 2002: 1). According to its chair in 2000, Harry Freeman (2000: 
458) (formerly a vice  president of American Express): ‘The U.S. private sector on 
trade in services is probably the most powerful trade lobby, not only in the United 
States but also in the world.’ CSI’s ‘foremost goal is to open foreign markets to US 
business and allow them to compete abroad.’ (CSI, 2003b). 
 
CSI claims to have ‘played an aggressive role in writing’ and ‘ shaping’ the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), included in the WTO at the end of the 
Uruguay Round (Vastine, 1999). Freeman (2000: 458) states: ‘At the close of the 
Uruguay Round, we lobbied and lobbied. We had about 400 people from the U.S. 
private sector.’ 
 
CSI has ongoing goals with respect to trade in services. It wants nations to commit to 
pensions policies that would ‘encourage private savings for retirement’ and thus 
provide opportunities for foreign investment companies to profit from people’s 
retirement, which would be precluded by a government pension scheme (CSI, 1999). 
The Bush administration subsequently pushed for this approach to aged pensions in 
the US (Beder, 2006b). 
 
Health care services are another CSI target. The CSI makes the doubtful claim that 
competition in the US health care field has enabled cost reductions to occur whilst 
quality has improved. The companies involved stand to gain from the opportunities 
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that the rapid growth of health care expenditures in some other countries might offer. 
This requires that nations open up their health care markets to competition and allow 
majority foreign ownership of their health care facilities. (CSI, 1999) 
 
US companies have been excluded from this profit opportunity by the fact that health 
care has traditionally been a government responsibility in most countries. In OECD 
countries barriers such as restrictive licensing of health care professionals and 
‘excessive privacy and confidentiality regulations’ continue to be an obstacle to foreign 
companies (CSI, 1999). 
 
The CSI demonstrated the power of business coalitions in setting the agenda and 
influencing the outcomes of trade negotiations during the Uruguay Round and 
subsequent negotiations. In fact it inspired similar service industry coalitions in other 
countries that hope to profit from access to markets in foreign countries (O’Hare, 2002: 
2). These include the Australian Services Roundtable, the Irish Coalition of Service 
Industries and the Hong Kong Coalition of Service Industries.  
 
But CSI did more than provide a model to emulate. It also actively took part in the 
formation of later coalitions. Freeman and the CSI played a major role in the 
formation and running of some of these business coalitions, including the MTN 
(Multilateral Trade Negotiations) Coalition, the Financial Leaders Group and the 
Global Services Network. CSI is also one of the Associate Expert Groups for the 
Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) to the OECD. 
 
On the other side of the Atlantic, British Invisibles (BI – renamed later as 
International Financial Services, London, IFSL), a UK business coalition, played an 
active role in forming and running national and European business coalitions to push 
for GATS (Beder, 2006a). Unlike CSI, British Invisibles formalized its access to key 
government bureaucrats through a committee structure that included sympathetic 
government officials from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), HM Treasury, 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Bank of England and the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA). This Liberalisation of Trade in Services (LOTIS) committee 
began meeting in the early 1980s with the aim of influencing the GATT negotiations. 
It became the main lobbying organization for the UK financial services industry. 
(IFSL 2003) 
 
Because of the hybrid business/government nature of the LOTIS committee, financial 
corporations were privy to government information that was not publicly available, 
including internal EU papers and draft submissions to the WTO from other nations. 
They also had high level access to government negotiators and WTO officials (Beder, 
2006a). 
 
Leaked documents indicate that the LOTIS committee was influential in getting EC 
negotiators to push for a strict ‘necessity test’ within GATS. A WTO secretariat memo 
states that trade ministers had agreed that if such regulations were challenged in the 
WTO, a defense of “safeguarding the public interest” would be rejected. The memo 
suggests that if the WTO adopted ‘efficiency’ as a criterion rather than public interest, 
then government leaders would have more excuse to eliminate unwanted social and 
environmental regulations even if their citizens wanted them. If regulatory authorities 
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or citizen groups demand regulation, politicians could avoid it by saying that WTO 
rules would not allow it as it was too burdensome to industry. (Palast, 2001b) 
 
 
GETTING A NEW ROUND STARTED 
 
Following the successful outcome of the Uruguay Round and the establishment of the 
WTO in 1995, various business lobbies worked to get a new round of WTO 
negotiations started that would include issues such as investment and the opening of 
government procurement to tender from foreign companies. The chair of the US 
Council for  International Business (USCIB), Dean O’Hare (2001), claimed to have 
“helped secure the launch of the new round of WTO trade negotiations” using the 
networks of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the OECD's Business 
and Industry Advisory Council “to build overseas support for U.S. business objectives” 
in the new round:  
American business stands to be a major winner from the new round of trade 
liberalization talks… USCIB worked diligently to help set the table for a 
new round, laying out benchmarks for U.S. negotiators in a variety of areas 
and exploring the possible inclusion of new issues like competition policy, 
environment and investment.   
The Europeans have also played an active role in promoting the new round. The ERT 
established a working group on Foreign Economic Relations in 1998, chaired by Peter 
Sutherland, formerly Director-General of GATT. It led delegations to meet with the 
Director-General of the WTO, Renato Ruggiero, and Mike Moore when he took over 
from Ruggiero. The ERT continues to work with the US Business Roundtable (BRT) to 
assure the success of this new round of negotiations. (ERT, 2003b: 68, 97) 
 
Similarly the European employers association, UNICE, had seven working groups and 
more than 20 lobbyists on WTO issues.  Renamed BusinessEurope in 2007 it claims to 
represent “more than 20 million small, medium, and large companies” through 
membership of “40 central industrial and employers’ federations from 34 countries” 
(BusinessEurope, 2009). It worked with the EC to gather support for a new, 
comprehensive round that would include issues such as investment and government 
procurement. It was “by far the most visible European lobby group” at the 1999 
Seattle WTO Ministerial  meeting. (CEO, 2000a, 2000b) 
 
Business groups had hoped a new round would begin at WTO Ministerial meeting in 
Seattle in December 1999 and spent millions lobbying to that end (Madeley, 2000: 11, 
16). The US Alliance for Trade Expansion (USTrade) ran a series of ‘education’ events 
across the US in the lead up to the Seattle meeting. It also organized a ‘war room’ in 
Seattle in the week before the WTO ministerial meeting “to provide rapid response 
from the pro-trade business community to the  many allegations expected to be raised 
by protestors” (Paulson, 1999; USTrade, 1999).  
 
USTrade was chaired by executives from Boeing, Caterpillar and Procter and Gamble. 
Its steering committee included members of the American Chemistry Council, the 
National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), Ford Motor Company, Texas 
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Instruments, the Business Roundtable,  USCIB and the US Chamber of Commerce. It 
was housed at NAM. As with other coalitions its members featured a who’s who of 
American corporations and trade associations including the American Petroleum 
Institute, Bayer, Chubb, DaimlerChrysler, DuPont, Federal Express, Hewlett-
Packard, the National Mining Association, Nestle, Pfizer (USTrade, 1999, 2002).  
 
The Seattle host committee, chaired by Bill Gates, CEO of Microsoft and Philip 
Condit, CEO of Boeing, offered corporations various levels of access to negotiators and 
ministers according to their level of donation (Clarke, c. 1999: 1). However at the 
meeting the  US and the EU could not agree on agricultural trade concessions and 
developing countries claimed that whilst they were having to open up their markets 
the affluent countries were not making similar concessions. Developing countries, sick 
and tired of being marginalised in the decision-making process,  and encouraged by 
the vigorous street protests going on outside, refused to passively go along with any 
negotiated deal that they had not participated in. (Kwa, 2003: 19; Madeley, 2000: 13-
14) 
 
To counter the growing public opposition to free trade negotiations, particularly with 
regard to services and investment, business launched a new public relations 
campaign. Opposition to the expansion of free trade rules was labelled ‘globophobia’, 
and business groups sought to portray free trade in a more favourable light (Beder, 
2006a: 194-200).  
 
Hoedeman and Doherty (2002: 67, 71) describe how: “Since Seattle, US business has 
engaged in a multi-faceted, multimillion-dollar counter-campaign involving individual 
corporations, lobby groups like the Business Roundtable and the US Chamber of 
Commerce, corporate-sponsored think tanks, and of course the ever-faithful PR 
industry”. Similarly Phillip Babich (2000) from the National Radio Project noted how 
“corporations are showering the US congress with well-funded lobbying campaigns 
and pro-free trade think-tanks are engaging in an information war for public opinion.” 
 
European business coalitions such as the ERT and the European Service Forum (ESF) 
“intensified their behind-the-scenes lobbying and left the public” campaigning to 
Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy and industry-funded think tanks such as the 
European Policy Centre and the Centre for European Policy Studies. Exceptions 
included an information campaign by Swedish Employer Organisation, Svenskt 
Nringsliv, targeting high school students and a campaign by the Association of 
German Industries (BDI). (Hoedeman & Doherty, 2002: 67, 71, 72) 
 
 
THE DOHA ROUND 
 
At the next ministerial meeting in Doha in 2001 developing countries again found 
themselves marginalised. However this time the US and the EU were more united. 
This was partly because of the efforts of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) 
(CEO, 2001; Kwa, 2003: 19; Public Citizen, 2003).  
 
TABD is a coalition of 100 CEOs of US and European companies formed in 1995 to 
present a unified and powerful front to trade negotiators. Because its membership 
Business-Managed Democracy Sharon Beder 12 
 
 
 
consists of corporate CEOs of large TNCs, TABD has high level daily access to 
governments and uses it to pressure them to sign up for business-friendly trade 
agreements such as GATS. The Clinton Administration “established an entire inter-
agency working group just to work on the TABD’s demands.” (Public Citizen, 2003; 
TABD, 2002, 2004) 
 
Balanyá et. al., (2000: 107) note that: “Over the past few years, the TABD has 
presented its demands in the form of a ‘scorecard’, setting ‘priorities’ for governments 
to focus on, and even going as far as to set ‘deadlines’ for completion. The audacity of 
this ‘scorecard’ approach reflects the cosy relationship the TABD enjoys with 
government, and its conviction that its recommendations will be carried out.” 
 
TABD develops policies that suit big business. The US and the EU then present them 
to the WTO as ‘done deals’. Public Citizen (Public Citizen, 2003) notes: “The TABD has 
been labelled the ‘new paradigm for trade liberalization’ by its proponents because it 
eliminates the ‘middle man’ from trade policy-making. That middle man is the U.S. 
and E.U. governments, and by extension, U.S. and E.U. citizens and consumer, labor 
and environmental NGOs.” 
 
The TABD gives the US-EU block strategic direction in the WTO negotiations and this 
provides a formidable power block to bully and marginalise smaller countries. This 
was evident at the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Doha in 2001. An African delegate 
claimed: “we made so many suggestions before Doha but they were ignored… We gave 
texts. We didn’t know where they went, but they didn’t find their way to the draft 
declaration”. Similarly a South Asian delegate pointed out: “We would object to a text, 
but it would still appear. We would state we wanted a text added in, and still it would 
not appear.” (quoted in Kwa, 2003: 23)  
 
The BRT joined with ERT, the ICC and the Canadian Council of Chief Executives in 
2003 to launch a multimillion dollar advertising campaign to support the Doha Round. 
The aim was to persuade the public that further free trade will create billions of 
dollars worth of wealth for all concerned. (BRT, 2003; Anon, 2005; InvestmentWatch, 
2003) 
 
The draft text presented to the 2003 Cancún meeting was put together by the WTO 
without consultation with the full WTO membership and reflected the position of the 
US and the EU rather than the developing nations (Hilary, 2004: 6, 10). A major 
reason for the intransigence of the US and the EU in the negotiations was the 
pressure being put on them by business. Not only were various powerful business 
coalitions pushing for free trade to be expanded to incorporate free investment but the 
agribusiness lobby was well represented at Cancún. The US delegation alone included 
some 70 corporate advisers, including those representing the interests of agricultural 
corporations. These interests were also well represented on the EC delegation. (Hilary, 
2004: 22) 
 
Whilst corporate advisors were included on many delegations and had access to 
negotiating documents, NGOs and civil society representatives were excluded. Those 
developing nations that tried to include them were pressured not to, according to an 
ActionAid report that cited Uganda and Kenya as examples. Similarly the UK 
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criticised some EU countries for sharing too much information with civil society 
representatives. (Hilary, 2004: 23) 
 
Further negotiations in 2004 resulted in the dropping of investment, government 
procurement and competition policy from the agenda of the current round of 
negotiations but in return “developing nations will have to open up their economies to 
imports of manufactured goods and to large service companies in return for vague 
promises on agricultural reform.” (WDM, 2004) 
 
USTrade was reborn in 2005 as ABCDoha (American Business Coalition for Doha) 
with a mission of amplifying “the voice of American business in advocating for an 
ambitious, balanced, and comprehensive agreement from the Doha Round”, by 
working closely with “the U.S. Administration, U.S. Congress, WTO leadership, 
officials and colleagues in other WTO member countries, and other NGOs” as well as 
“conducting widespread education campaigns about the benefits of trade 
liberalization” (ABCDoha, 2006). 
 
The business community continues to press for a successful conclusion of the Doha 
Round. In April 2009 the G8 Business Leaders, a group representing business 
coalitions in G8 nations,  declared the need for G8 governments to “strengthen and 
publicly renew their full commitment to an open global  economy… The successful 
conclusion of the Doha Round lies at the very heart” of this commitment and would 
provide “the strongest possible stimulus for the recovery of the global economy” (G8 
Business Leaders, 2009).  
 
G8 government leaders have not been slow to confirm their commitment to open global 
trade.i The difficulty for Doha negotiators is persuading the rest of the world that it is 
in their interests to sign up to this business-managed democracy.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Business coalitions and networks work on the principle that a “combined voice is more 
powerful than one that is fragmented” (Buxton, 1999: 2). Companies that are 
theoretically competitors in the market, cooperate with each other to protect business 
interests against democratic regulations and restrictions. Individual firms network 
with national sectoral associations, national sectoral associations network within 
national peak associations such as the US Chamber of Commerce or USCIB, and 
national peak associations network with international peak associations such as the 
ICC (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000: 491). 
 
USCIB (2003) notes that: 
Leading American companies increasingly recognize that, to succeed 
abroad, they must join together with like-minded firms to influence laws, 
rules and policies that may undermine U.S. competitiveness, wherever they 
may be… By helping shape international regulation and expand market 
access for U.S. products and services, USCIB members can lower the costs 
of doing business abroad and enhance their long-term profitability. 
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The European Services Forum (ESF) similarly recognized that: “By tabling a 
coordinated document, the industry will be stronger within the European Union and 
vis-à-vis the other WTO Member States and will give to their sectoral requests a 
political dimension that individual sectors will not be able to achieve.” (Kerneis, 2000: 
5)  
 
A great number of trade coalitions have been formed for this purpose of presenting a 
combined and powerful  voice for business. These coalitions are tightly networked and 
closely interrelated through their common corporate membership. This multiplicity of 
coalitions with heavily overlapping membership and leadership enables corporations 
to multiply their power and influence. 
 
The enlistment of regulators, bureaucrats and politicians in their cause has been a key 
achievement of those lobbying for various agreements within the GATT and the WTO. 
This is made easier by the phenomenon of the revolving door. Large corporations are 
able to offer lucrative positions, including directorships, to those who are supportive of 
their aims. 
 
The “unprecedented levels of strategic alliances and global networks” created by TNCs 
have been referred to as a new form of capitalism: ‘alliance capitalism’. In this new 
form of capitalism, TNCs have more in common with, and show more loyalty to, TNCs 
from around the world than with the countries where they are headquartered (Sklair, 
2002: 65). Despite this shift in allegiance, national governments still go out of their 
way to facilitate the business activities of these TNCs and to ensure government social 
policies do not unduly impede those activities. 
 
Trade issues have traditionally been considered to be an area that should be handled 
by specialist experts in trade, who make technocratic decisions, rather than elected 
officials accountable to the public. WTO papers are not published and trade 
negotiators do not discuss the likely trade offs they will have to make—such as the 
loss of government autonomy over social services—with citizens of their  countries 
before they embark on the  negotiations, nor are the citizens informed of the content of 
the negotiations and the positions taken by their negotiators. (Braithwaite & Drahos, 
2000: 209-11; Esty, 2002: 10) 
 
The rise of corporate power and the increasing importance accorded to markets mean 
that TNCs are eclipsing the nation state as the driving force behind policy-making. 
The corporate goal of free trade has been given precedence over other citizen goals 
such as environmental protection, improved working conditions, affordable and 
accessible electricity and water, universal health care and schooling. Each of these 
areas of social policy has been subject to commodifiation, marketisation, privatisation 
and deregulation in the name of free markets. 
 
So-called ‘free’ markets are becoming the new organising principle for the global order. 
The idea that governments should protect citizens against the excesses of free 
enterprise has been replaced with the idea that government should protect business 
activities against the excesses of democratic regulation. The bottom line is a business-
managed democracy. 
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